

THE MEANING
OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT IN
THE REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX

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The idea of Regional Security Complexes was created by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. The theory has simple assumptions. According to the Authors, the security issues can be grouped into geographically separated regional complexes. They assume that security problems are rarely of vital importance when the distance is large; similar dangers are mostly encountered in the same regions. Interdependence between actors in the same region is much stronger than between actors from different regions or between regions as a whole¹.

This theory also emphasises the role of global and regional powers in the post-Cold War world. The Authors divide such powers into three categories: *superpowers*, *powers* and *regional powers*. They assume that the global system may be influenced exclusively by the *superpowers*. Today, the US is the only country that plays this role. According to the Authors, only a few selected regions may be influenced by the *powers*. The theory assumes that after the Cold War there were four actors that could be called *powers*: China, Japan and Russia and the EU. The last category are the *regional powers*. In each region there are *regional powers*, which exert influence over a single region².

Buzan and Waever characterize the Middle East after the end of the Cold War. In this region, the impact of the

US increased and it influenced the regional security dynamics. What is interesting is that we have observed a reduction in the meaning of external pressure in the whole world, where regional actors had more acting space. The only region where a superpower was more important is the Middle East³.

According to the Authors, the Middle Eastern security is a continuous “conflict formation”. They divide the Middle East complex into three sub-complexes (Maghreb, Levant and the Persian Gulf)⁴. They characterise the region as a place with a large number of regional conflicts and unipolar domination of the US. It has strengthened the position of Israel, led to isolation of Iraq and Iran, and weakened the former Soviet Union client states. According to the Authors, the Arab–Israeli conflict still remains politically and symbolically central, although it is no longer the epicentre of the region’s violence⁵.

The article shows the actual meaning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Regional Security Complex. In the first part, it aims to describe the short history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in the second part, to explain the most serious security problems in the region.

The war between the newly established Jewish State and its Arab neighbours started immediately after the declaration of independence of Israel, although at that time it was an Arab-Israeli conflict not an Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arabs from Palestine were represented by governments of the neighbouring countries. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict started after the Six-Day War. In 1967, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; all these territories were inhabited by Palestinians. The inhabitants of these areas began to be ruled by the Israelis. Paradoxically, contacts of Arab inhabitants of Palestine with Jewish neighbours influenced the formation of their identity and accelerated their development. It can be assumed that the formation of the

Palestinian identity ended symbolically by the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987. In the next year, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation declared independence of Palestine. Some world countries (especially those associated with the Soviet Union) adopted this declaration and recognized the state of Palestine.

After the collapse of the bipolar world, there was hope for a peaceful solution of the conflict. The Oslo peace process started in 1993. It resulted in the establishment of the Palestinian Autonomy. In 1995, the whole Gaza Strip and eight cities in the West Bank got under Palestinian administration. This process was to be crowned with the creation of a Palestinian state. In 2000, the Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak met the Palestinian president Jasir Arafat and the American president Bill Clinton in Camp David. At the meeting, they talked about the final solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unfortunately, the talks did not end successfully. The same year saw the beginning of the new Intifada (al Aksa Intifada), which buried hope for peace. Afterwards, the situation was even more complicated. In 2007, Hamas started to rule the Gaza Strip. Now, the West Bank is ruled by Fatah and the Gaza Strip – by Hamas. However, there are other problems as well. All the time there are tensions between Hamas and Israel. The process of constructing Jewish settlements makes the peace talks even more difficult. In addition, Palestinian attacks on Israelis have been continued since September 2015.

One can have an impression that the Israeli government, especially the Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, does not want to continue talks. The Israeli authorities have learned how to manage the conflict and they lack the will to negotiate. The international pressure is insufficient as well. One may assume that the new American administration will not put pressure on Israel. It is doubtful that the peace process will be resumed in the nearest future.

I think that at the moment the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the region is decreasing. We have some more serious problems in the Middle East. The following ones should be mentioned among them: the Sunni-Shia and Arab-Persian conflicts, the rivalry of the regional powers, influences of radical or militant Islam (Daesh, Front Fatah asz-Sham), influences by external powers in the region (in particular China and Russia) and importance of the non-state actors (Hizbollah, Front Fatah asz-Sham, Kurds).

Let me now briefly describe each of them.

The Sunni-Shia and Arab-Persian conflict

The Sunni-Shia conflict is very old. The split in Islam occurred after the death of the prophet Muhammad in the year 632. Then the dispute regarding succession started. Sunnis believe that Abu Bakr, the father of Muhammad's wife Aisha, was Muhammad's rightful successor and the method of choosing leaders is the consensus of the *Ummah*. Shias think that Ali Ibn Abi Talib Muhammad's son-in-law and his grandsons (sons of Ali) Hasan ibn Ali and Hussein ibn Ali should have been his successors. The tension intensified after the Battle of Karbala, in which Hussein ibn Ali was killed by Caliph Yazid I.

For centuries the tension between Sunnis and Shiites has been either rising or decreasing⁶. Nowadays, it is getting stronger. The problems between Shias and Sunnis are of international and internal character. We are now witnessing the same wars and religion is a very important factor in them. In Iraq, the government forces supported by the Shiite militias have been fighting in Sunni Daesh. In Syria, the situation is more complicated. Syrian rebels (mostly Sunnis) were fighting against Assad's regime (Assad is of Alavite background). The government is supported by Shias (militias, Hezbollah, Shias from

Iran). Major General Yaakov Amidror from the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) wrote about the war in Syria: “That war is not just a civil war between different factions of Syrian society. It is a war between Shiites and Sunnis, with Iran standing behind one side and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and Turkey, to a certain extent, backing the other”⁷.

There is a civil war in Yemen between forces loyal to the government of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and those allied to the Houthi rebel movement. Even in Saudi Arabia, the tension between the Sunni majority and the Shia minority is very strong. In January 2016, the Saudi Arabia authorities decided to execute the prominent Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr and 46 Shias prisoners. This execution triggered protests around the world (especially among Shiites), even in Saudi Arabia⁸.

Serious tensions between Shiites and Sunnis also occurred in Lebanon and Bahrain. In Lebanon, the tension increased because of the war in Syria. In 2011 and 2012, there were demonstrations in Bahrain. Most of the protesters were Shia Muslims. They demanded more rights for their population (which constitutes a majority in the country). In response to these events, the government introduced martial law; moreover, they arrested activists and demolished Shiite mosques. Some tension between Sunnis and Shiites occurred even in the countries where basically there is no Shi'a minority (for example in Egypt). In 2013, four Shia Muslims were killed near Cairo⁹.

The polls show the scale of distrust and hatred. In 2011 and 2012, the Pew Research Centre asked Muslims in five countries (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Lebanon) about relations between Sunnis and Shiites. In Lebanon, 67% of all Muslims referred to the Sunni-Shia tensions as a very or moderately big problem in their country. 52% of Muslims said the same in Iraq and 23% – in Iran¹⁰.

According to Yaakov Amidror, the Sunni-Shia conflict applied to the struggle for regional leadership between Saudi Arabia and Iran¹¹. There is no indication that in the future the tension between Sunnis and Shiites will be reduced.

The rivalry of the regional powers

The Middle East is the region where the states try to compete with each other for the title of the regional power. Louise Fawcett identified Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey as the possible powers in the Middle East¹². According to Fawcett, regional powers should meet the following criteria: (a) deploy a mix of hard and soft power resources (b) promote regional institutions (c) provide public goods (d) set the regional agenda (e) build co-operation, and (f) bear the costs of cooperation [source?]. Some of those countries are no longer the regional powers (Egypt and Syria). Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran have limited leadership qualities. According to Fawcett, in some sense Israel is an “obvious regional great power”¹³, but according to Robert Kappel, “Israel is not a regional power that is able to manage regional order”¹⁴.

There are also different proposals of regional power catalogs. According to Anoushiravan Ehteshani, there are four powers in the Middle East – Turkey, Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia¹⁵.

Nowadays, rivalry for importance and for spheres of influence takes place between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both countries have been involved in the war in Syria. Iran has supported the Syrian regime. Saudi Arabia has supported some groups of rebels and it has been involved in a coalition directed against Daesh. Yemen is also the scene of fighting between the two countries. Iran has helped the Shiite rebels from Houthi group. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has directly supported president Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi.

Turkey has been another country involved in the Syrian conflict. The country has officially fought against Daesh, but it has also tried to protect its interests and to reduce the possessions of Iraqi Kurds.

Currently, Syria and Iraq are not subjects but objects of international relations. Egypt has also been weakened by the Arab Spring and by the events after the overthrow of President Mursi. The present government is focusing on internal problems of the country – first of all on the fight against jihadists from the Sinai Peninsula.

Israel is without a doubt one of the major powers in the region, but the Jewish State has not been officially involved in any regional disputes that do not apply to it.

Influences of radical or militant Islam

The increasing importance of radical or militant Islam is a serious problem in the Middle East. We had been observing an increase in the importance of radical Islam in the Middle East for a long time, the real turning point was, however, the creation of Daesh (ISIS, Islamic State). In 2014, Daesh took possession of large areas of Iraq and Syria and in June 2014, their leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed caliphate.

It was the first time that an organization considered to be terrorist, seized significant areas of the world and tried to create quasi-state structures. The existence of Daesh is a serious danger to the world. That is why, in August 2014, an international coalition against Daesh was created. In October 2015, the Russian air force appeared in Syria. Russians began bombarding under the pretence of defeating Daesh areas controlled by the rebels.

Although ISIS has lost control over successive areas, it is still very dangerous. Various terrorist organizations have recognized the supremacy of Daesh. Jihadists affiliated with ISIS operate on the Sinai Peninsula or in

Libya. Besides, sympathizers of Daesh carry out terrorist attacks in Europe and the US.

Western countries are aware of the scale of the threat. But unfortunately, you have to agree with Krzysztof Strachota, who wrote: “It is therefore quite certain that even in a most optimistic scenario in which IS is destroyed, new problems of a similar scale will emerge”¹⁶.

Some politicians claim that militant Islam is not only Daesh. In 2014, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu said: “As Hamas’s charter makes clear, Hamas’s immediate goal is to destroy Israel. But Hamas has a broader objective. They also want a caliphate. Hamas shares the global ambitions of its fellow militant Islamists (...). So, when it comes to their ultimate goals, Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas. And what they share in common, all militant Islamists share in common: Boko Haram in Nigeria; Ash-Shabab in Somalia; Hizbullah in Lebanon; An-Nusrah in Syria; The Mahdi Army in Iraq; and the al-Qaeda branches in Yemen, Libya, the Philippines, India and elsewhere”¹⁷.

According to Netanyahu, not only the above-mentioned organizations represent militant Islam. “The question before us is whether militant Islam will have the power to realize its unbridled ambitions. There is one place where that could soon happen: The Islamic State of Iran”¹⁸.

Radical Islamic ideas are particularly popular in the Middle East, but affect the whole world. Terrorist attacks take place in different parts of the world. Thousands of immigrants have been arriving in Europe.

International societies focus on the war in Syria and Iraq. Citizens of Middle Eastern countries also consider ISIS to be their basic problem. In September 2015, six out of ten surveyed in Iraq (61%) and more than three-quarters in Egypt, the UAE, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan and Lebanon believed that ISIS plays a significant role in causing conflict in Iraq. More than three-quarters surveyed in each of these countries said that extremist

groups like al Qaeda and ISIS play a significant role in causing conflict in Syria and majority in each of these countries view ISIS as a serious problem (100% in Egypt, 100% in the UAE, 95% in Turkey, 88% in Saudi Arabia, 76% in Iraq, 74% in Iran, 65% in Jordan, and 58% in Lebanon)¹⁹.

In April and May 2015, people from five countries (Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian territories and Turkey) were asked about their attitude towards ISIS. The intensity of concern about ISIS varies greatly. Vast majority of the public in Lebanon (84%) and Jordan (62%) say they are very concerned about ISIS, just like over half in the Palestinian territories (54%). However, only the minority of the society in Israel (44%) and Turkey (33%) say they are very concerned. Similarly, the Lebanese express the most concern about Islamic extremism (67%) and the Turkish the least concern (19%), with Palestinians (40%), Israelis (37%), and Jordanians (27%) in between. Roughly half or more of people across all the countries surveyed say, however, that they are at least somewhat concerned about Islamic extremism in their country²⁰.

Opinion polls show that in the Middle East there is a fear of radical Islam.

*Influences of the external powers in the region
(in particular China and Russia)*

The world is closely monitoring the influence of China and Russia in the region. In contrast to Western countries (especially the EU), China and Russia are ready to intensify contacts with countries which do not adopt the standards of democracy and human rights. This is what sometimes makes them better partners for some countries.

China has good economic relations with some countries in the Middle East. In 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Cairo. During this visit, Egypt and China agreed to a

number of massive bilateral deals. One that stands out is a \$45 billion Chinese-funded project to build a new Egyptian capital outside of Cairo. The project's symbolic importance is obvious: China wants to cement its role as the region's biggest ally, in place of the US²¹.

China has also good relations with Iran. The country played a pivotal diplomatic role during the P5+1 negotiations and was an arbiter between Iran and the United States, winning the trust of officials in Tehran. Additionally, Chinese President Xi Jinping became the first world leader to visit Iran after the deal (January 2016). China is interested in Iran because of Iran's large oil and gas reserves and wants to substantially assist in Iran's economic development, especially under the implementation of 'One Belt, One Road' plan.

The most important area of the Sino-Iranian cooperation is military cooperation. Some of military Chinese technologies would be attractive to Iran (anti-ship cruise missiles, long distance air-to-air missiles and sea mines)²².

China and Iran share the same desire – to minimize the US dominance in the Middle East.

Despite cooperation with Iran, China also cooperates with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. John Garver wrote that “as China's relations with Iran strengthen, its ties to Saudi Arabia are likely to deteriorate, despite Chinese efforts to assuage Saudi concerns of favouritism toward Iran”²³.

The Chinese-Saudi ties are still strong. In August 2016, Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud visited Beijing. He signed 15 agreements and memorandums of understanding during his visit to China²⁴.

Economic cooperation is very intensive. Saudi-Chinese trade has increased from around \$1 billion in 1990 to more than \$70 billion by 2013. China is Saudi Arabia's largest customer for oil, and Saudi Arabia in turn is China's largest provider of oil, meeting around 20 percent of

Chinese demand. The China-Saudi Arabia bilateral ties are growing due to the 'One Belt, One Road' Chinese strategic outline²⁵.

The Chinese-Saudi partnership still retains its energy-economic character; it's not a military-political alliance.

But Beijing is trying to interact with the region in the military and diplomatic dimensions. China played a significant role in the talks with Iran. In addition, it hosted representatives of opposing Syrian factions and tried to promote an Israeli-Palestinian peace plan during separate visits by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas²⁶.

Russia also demonstrated a growing interest in the region. The clearest example of this is the Russian intervention in Syria. On 30 September 2015, Russia started a military intervention. Russian aircraft supported the al-Assad regime launching air strikes against rebels.

The relations with Teheran also became tighter. After the Arab uprisings, Moscow political and economic presence in the Middle East was shrinking. This situation demanded that Moscow be more active in maintaining contacts with Tehran. What is more, tensions between Russia and the West after the Crimea annexation drove the Kremlin to strengthen cooperation with Iran²⁷.

Russia is also a member of the Quartet on the Middle East, which is involved in mediating the peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Russian involvement in the peace process is remote, but Moscow had some proposals. In October 2016, Russia was trying hard to host a direct Israeli-Palestinian summit. The country is also in close contact with both sides of the conflict.

Russian relations with Israel are very intensive. In November 2015, new Israeli Ambassador to Russia Zvi Heifetz said that Russia and Israel plan to mark the 25th anniversary of Israeli-Russian diplomatic relations "at the highest possible level". In the same month, Russian

President Vladimir Putin said: “We are satisfied with our constructive partnership with Israel. Relations between our states have reached a high level”²⁸.

Relations with Palestinian Authorities are also very close. Abdel Hafiz Nofal, the Palestinian envoy to Russia, said in October 2016 that “Russia totally supports the Palestinian right for self-determination and the need for an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital”. He also added that, in his opinion, the support of Russia is “much stronger and more dependable” than that of the Soviet Union”²⁹.

According to Anna Borschevskaya, “In the Middle East, Putin is likely to continue to strengthen alliances with non-Western actors to maintain his grip on power. Putin’s Russia is thus likely to remain an obstacle to peace and stability in the Middle East, and a proliferator of conflict, rather than the partner the West had hoped for”³⁰.

Importance of the non-state actors

(Hizbollah, ISIS, Front Fatah asz-Sham, Kurds)

The Middle East is a part of the world where we can see an increasing importance of non-state actors. The instability of some countries and the ongoing wars are conducive to the functioning of non-state actors.

Vincent Durac described the situation in the Middle East as follows: “States with low levels of legitimacy are unable to maintain the loyalty of many within their populations. When such states resort to repression they typically provoke opposition. Similarly, when states exclude significant elements of their populations through neglect, lack of capacity or some other form of discrimination, they can create the conditions within which violent non-state actors emerge. Where the State fails to provide security or other basic services, violent non-state actors can move in to provide alternative governance, services and

collective goods and thus increasing their own legitimacy in the process³¹.

Non-state actors in the Middle East are different. Hizbollah and IS are examples of the type of non-state actors that influence regional order. Front Fatah asz-Sham (al-Nusra Front) and the Kurds exert influence only in part of the region. Some of their structures have been operating for decades (Hizbollah and some Kurds organizations), others have appeared relatively recently (ISIS and the al-Nusra Front). Some of them have complex structures, others are primarily of a military nature.

Non-state actors are becoming more common. Carmit Valensi wrote: "On the practical level, states in the region would do well to become accustomed to the non-state environment – which will apparently become increasingly common in the Middle East - *inter alia*, by adopting non-state thinking. This statement is more acceptable in its military contexts. The past four decades have proven that Israel's adversaries have gone from states to non-state actors and have led to an improvement in thinking and strategy for dealing with them. It would appear that the time has come to expand military thinking to other areas (including the political, diplomatic, and legal). These could assist us in better understanding and coping with non-state phenomena in the Middle East. They could even enable us to think in terms of collaborations and alliances with non-state actors with regional influence"³².

A serious challenge for the world will also be maintaining the Sikes-Picot order. It undermines not only ISIS but also the Kurdish aspirations. Laura Bröker wrote "there is no doubt that the Kurds' military capabilities and successes have strengthened their role on the international stage. Enhanced cooperation and recognition, however, have not yet translated into political power, but remain at a military level. The reluctance of Western governments (...) to embrace Kurdish advances toward independence

or greater autonomy raise further questions of how these governments will act once ISIS is defeated and Kurdish military support no longer needed”³³.

It can be assumed that even after the fall of Daesh the role of non-state actors in the Middle East will be significant. The Kurds do not give up their aspirations and Hezbollah will continue to operate in Lebanon and Syria. Hamas will rule in the Gaza Strip, and probably different groups of jihadists will operate in the region.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Nowadays, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not so important. Buzan and Waever wrote “Although the Arab-Israeli conflict still remains politically and symbolically central, it is no longer the epicentre of the region’s violence”³⁴. Neither politically nor symbolically central are probably the current Arab-Israeli or Israeli-Palestinian conflicts.

Certainly the scale of violence is small as compared to the events in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. According to B’Tselem, from the beginning of the Second Intifada until July 2014, 6890 Palestinians and 1091 Israelis were killed during the conflict³⁵.

Terrorist attacks during which vehicles or knives were used, started in September 2015. According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since 13 September 2015, 47 people have been killed and 659 people injured³⁶. Ma’an News Agency has recorded the death of 275 individuals between 1 October 2015 and 30 September 2016 (236 were Palestinians, 34 were Israelis and five were of foreign nationality)³⁷.

These numbers are insignificant in comparison with other ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. During the conflict in Syria alone, about 400 thousand people were killed³⁸.

For many years, the Israeli authorities have been taking action to reduce danger connected with the issue of

Palestine (defensive barrier-wall, separation of the Gaza Strip, Iron Dome).

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also losing the symbolic and political importance for Middle East countries. The Israeli government, on the one hand, tries to present Palestinian groups as radical and terrorist, while the Palestinian issues are presented as an internal Israeli problem.

During his speech in the United Nations General Assembly in September 2014, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said: “the same countries that now support confronting ISIS, opposed Israel for confronting Hamas. They evidently don’t understand that ISIS and Hamas are branches of the same poisonous tree. ISIS and Hamas share a fanatical creed, which they both seek to impose well beyond the territory under their control. Listen to ISIS’s self-declared caliph, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. This is what he said two months ago: A day will soon come when the Muslim will walk everywhere as a master... The Muslims will cause the world to hear and understand the meaning of terrorism... and destroy the idol of democracy. Now listen to Khaled Meshaal, the leader of Hamas. He proclaims a similar vision of the future: We say this to the West... By Allah you will be defeated. Tomorrow our nation will sit on the throne of the world. As Hamas’s charter makes clear, Hamas’s immediate goal is to destroy Israel. But Hamas has a broader objective. They also want a caliphate. Hamas shares the global ambitions of its fellow militant Islamists. (...) Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas”³⁹.

Prime Minister Netanyahu emphasized after the terrorist attack in Paris (November 2015) that “there is a common thread connecting the horrific attacks in Paris to Israel’s fight against Islamic terrorism,” and asserted: “There can be no compromise with the likes of ISIS, Hamas or Hezbollah, because compromise means forfeiting

the freedoms that make life worth living. The only choice is to fight”⁴⁰.

The increasing cooperation of Israel with other countries in the region prove the emergence of a new approach towards the conflict. Nowadays, Israel is trying to cooperate with Egypt and Turkey. It has the tactical and tacit partnership with Saudi Arabia. Common dangers (jihadist, Iran) are building a space of trust.

In September 2016, the Israeli Prime Minister said at the United Nations forum: “But now I’m going to surprise you even more. You see, the biggest change in attitudes towards Israel is taking place elsewhere. It’s taking place in the Arab world. Our peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan continue to be anchors of stability in the volatile Middle East. But I have to tell you this: For the first time in my lifetime, many other states in the region recognize that Israel is not their enemy. They recognize that Israel is their ally. Our common enemies are Iran and ISIS. Our common goals are security, prosperity and peace. I believe that in the years ahead we will work together to achieve these goals, work together openly”⁴¹.

The fact that countries in the world do not treat the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a central dimension in regional security complex in the Middle East does not mean that they are not interested in it at all. The issue of conflict has been discussed several times at the UN forum. It is worthwhile to mention two events: in November 2012 Palestine reached the status of a “non-member observer state”, and in December 2016, the Security Council adopted resolution 2334. 14 members of the Security Council voted for and only the US abstained. The resolution reads: “demand that Israel immediately and completely cease all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem”⁴².

These activities show that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still important for international society although I

do not suppose that it has enough possibilities to convince the Israeli government to change its attitude towards Palestinians. We can assume with great certainty that the Israeli-Palestinian relations will not change in the near future. We cannot hope for the end of the conflict, especially in view of changes to the US administration. Donald Trump, the new president of the US, said that a two-state solution is one of the alternatives⁴³. Under such conditions, the end of the conflict and the establishment of a Palestinian state seem unlikely.

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