

NATIONAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITY IN IRAQ
IN THE FACE OF FORMATION OF THE NEW POST
SYKES-PICOT ORDER IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION OF CONTEMPORARY ARAB
THINKERS AND POLITICAL REALITY

Paulina Jagoda Warsza

Conflicts in the MENA region are frequently seen as ethnic and religious not only by external observers, but also by societies for whom ethnic, tribal or religious loyalties are often the strongest mobilisation factors. All the same, those affiliations can be, and often are, treated instrumentally and used for political purposes, thus having a devastating impact on security and social order. In fact, the multi-level identity of MENA residents does not *per se* constitute the cause of the conflict. The actual cause of tension, which even the sides of the conflict are unaware of, is inequality, whether in access to power, resources or possibilities of self-realization. These forms of exclusion result in the marginalization of certain religious or ethnic groups, often through insufficient political representation. Breaking this vicious cycle is extremely difficult because, at least for some Muslims, the “Shia-Sunni conflict is a struggle for the soul of Islam”¹, a conflict between philosophical, theological concepts and “alternative versions of shared history seemingly so archaic, and yet so vital”², is reminiscent of historical tribal and ethnic animosities which provide grounds for many regional identities.

Dynamics of the events in the Middle East can be perceived through a prism of delayed recovery from the colonial system, and its consequences, such as the need for revision of the borders and spheres of influence. In this postcolonial perspective, subsequent wars, the Arab Spring, the creation and success of Daesh, etc. are interrelated steps in the process of creation of the post Sykes-Picot order in the region. After the so called Arab Spring, there has been no pan-regional change in terms of the nature of political systems or social structure. However, historical change may and must be happening now in the era of social awareness. The rise of extremism limits awareness and imagination. The Arab revolution has to perform much more serious acts than overthrow of dictators, must get rid of deficits, not in economic terms, but deficits in the field of education and aspiration, which shall enable the societies to flourish.

Iraq is often described as the most illogical experiment of the British Empire. Even the occupation zones or areas of responsibility, as a result of the 2003 war, corresponded to the ethnic divisions, and many took the division of the country into three parts seriously. What is the impact on the formation of the Iraqi identity of the absence of the principle of congruence, congruence of nationality, legitimized by a specific culture, state territory, as well as ethno-regionalist aspirations? The phenomenon of borderland culture and cultural conversion (Iraq is in the borderline area of Arab culture, and adjoins the Persian and Turkish ethnos) and, above all, the geostrategic position of Iraq – the Iran-Iraq border region is defined in geopolitics as a shatter-belt³ – the area particularly prone to conflict, of strategic importance for stability in the region. Furthermore, the former regional power has become an arena of proxy wars between the states and armed groups. All of these have a major influence on the formation of the Iraqi identity.

A famous Iraqi historian Abd-aziz ad Duri⁴ has presented an accurate analysis of the stage at which there is a sense of national identity and civic national movement of Iraqi society – “It is evident that, in many cases, national thought has not risen to the level at which there is a national movement and in many cases has a general character, sometimes romantic”⁵. And this is of fundamental significance for the development of civil society in Iraq, thus for the strength of the social fabric.

Ad Duri postulated the revival of Arab awareness, *wa’i Arabii*⁶, which constitutes an expression of the spirit of community, enables its emancipation. *Wa’i Arabii* is realized through the ideology of Arab nationalism – *al-qawmijja al-Arabiyya*⁷. Arab nationalism is, therefore, the final manifestation of the Arab consciousness. Arab nationalism has many of the characteristics of imagined nationalism, to paraphrase the theory of B. Anderson. What connects the Iraqis now, according to Ad Duri, are mostly the romantic feelings: the memory of the past glory, post war sense of humiliation and constant renewal of the national martyrdom⁸. This is the core and the primary cause of all the challenges facing civil society in Iraq *in statu nascendi*. Other researchers, with whom Ad- Duri argued, believed that ideas and goals of Arab nationalism are already nearly fulfilled, there is a need, therefore, to re-evaluate the current outlook. They have seen causes of past failures in external factors, while Ad Duri urged Arab intelligentsia to introspection and self-criticism, which until today is the avant-garde among wide segments of Arab intellectuals. Ad Duri, as a convinced, pan-Arabic thinker, however, gave the Arabs, and perhaps himself, hope for a speedy revival: “I believe that Arab nationalism has already exceeded its romantic stage, in which it lived before World War II. We began to realize, after the experience of the mid-twentieth century, that the construction does not start with the roof, but the foundations, and that this

type of experience requires a new look at the past and reflection on plans for the future”⁹.

One of the most prominent contemporary Arab philosophers, Malek Bennabi, who remains unknown, however, to the wider public also saw the causes of “the crisis of thought”¹⁰ in the internal factors. He created the concept of the post- Almohad Man and society which has a tendency to be colonized – a theory reflecting the moral condition and the stage of civilisational development of contemporary Arab societies. The foundation of society is its culture, which the researcher compared to blood. Ignorance of one’s own culture leads to a loss of identity and the collapse of civilization. The catalyst for the development of each civilisation, not only Muslim one, is religion¹¹. Bennabi was educated in the West, and yet he did not deny the need for achievements of other civilizations, advocated passing it through the filter of Muslim culture, as that would allow “for the adaptation of only some of its appearances – the body”, it would not allow for penetrating the “spirit of culture”. Historical perspective is extremely important in this context: “achievements of Western civilization are not timeless [or] ahistorical. They are [the] product of long development in certain socio-political conditions”¹². In the modern socio-political discourse that takes place between Islam and the West, both sides seem to forget this. Civilization is not given once and for all, society must first be able to recognize and then cherish its value¹³.

According to Bennabi, crisis of Islamic civilization began with the emergence of Shia, who have chosen reason over spirituality, thus spirit is now in crisis and guided only by instinct. The collapse of civilization began in the political aspect with the end of the reign of the Almohad in the Maghreb, and in a spiritual sense, with the death of Ibn Khaldun¹⁴. Mentally, the society of the Maghreb was still in the year 1269. “There has been no evolution

– neither social nor cultural, nor mental. The collapse of Almohad marked the start of – *inhibit*”. Bennabi's theory refers not only to the Maghreb, but to the whole world of Islam, the fall of the Almohad caused chaos in the Maghreb (reinforcing in this way the chaos resulting from the fall of Baghdad in the east of the Arab world). The post-Almohad man took germs, which has caused all social and political problems of the Arab world since the fourteenth century. That is why it is so difficult now to find strength for revival (*an nahda*). Muslims revere the post-Almohad man because of their social heritage, the ingrained habits and customs”¹⁵. This applies to everyone, from ordinary farmers, pseudo-elites, to the real part of the elite. “Obtaining a university [diploma] does not decay colonisability”¹⁶, and therefore, in fact, even the educated groups of society are not free from the legacy of the post Almohad Man.

Now, the Arab world needs to put more emphasis on morality, sociology and psychology than on experimental science (which Bennabi describes as “material”), due to the fact that, if man does not know himself, a lot of damage can be inflicted. Any person must recognize himself in the post-Almohad Man and have it all the time in mind, striving to solve all the problems besetting the Muslim world. “This new type of man is characterized by helplessness and lack of self-confidence, self-depreciating value, it all adds up to [being prone to colonisation]. “The post-Almohad man is only waiting for the colonizer, who will be able to instruct him to play any role”¹⁷.

What are the implications of Bennabi's theory for Iraq? According to the Algerian thinker, colonisability is not limited, in the strict sense, to the colonial experience, it is rather the state of collective consciousness, the social sense of impotence. Now this term is also used with reference to the countries of the Global South, which have never been colonised¹⁸. The situation of the occupied

countries is much different. “Colonisability means: emptiness, vacuity, moral decay, fragmentation and dirt. Such features of the society cause that over time the aggressor is transformed into the colonizer. The lack of “a tendency to be colonized”, on the other hand, means that the attacker becomes the occupier, which is associated with the existence of external factors, such as invasion, the internal resistance strength and reluctance to foreign domination. Thus, some external (the force intended to colonize) and internal factors are needed for completion of the tragedy of colonialism”¹⁹. Hence, according to Bennabi, colonization of Algeria by France, which began in 1830, was a kind of “destination” – an event that had to occur, because all conditions had been satisfied²⁰. The causes of the crisis of Arab national thought lie, therefore, in the internal factors. They reflect the moral condition and the stage of development of contemporary Arab societies. Is Bennabi’s theory applicable to Iraq? The US and the UK were occupying powers under international law, did they become colonizers in the public consciousness? Has colonisability survived in the mentality of Iraqis since the time of the British Mandate, perhaps earlier? The Iraqis certainly demonstrate strong resistance and opposition against the foreign domination, however, over the years, given the absence of significant changes in the internal situation, the sense of resignation, powerlessness and inner emptiness has been increasing. Should “killing the post – Almohad Man”²¹ be the aim of Arab societies as postulated by Bennabi, and should it be the only solution for those societies to develop? Although what Bennabi had in mind was rather liberation from auto-stereotype and reconstruction of identity, many still interpret his words literally.

Iraqi nationalism, i.e. a common identity essential to the functioning of a civil society, had been constituted, similarly as elsewhere in the Middle East, in response to

a foreign rule, (Turkish and British in this case). A sense of unity is therefore largely superficial and for individuals the clan, ethnic or religious affiliation continues to be of greatest significance. The emergence of a new oppressor, the Americans, enemies representing an alien culture, have forced Iraqis to try to overcome local divisions. However, the only secular ideas which Iraqi society could refer to, such as the ideology of Arab socialism, have devalued over the last decades. The only groups that have remained on the political scene refer in their rhetoric to ethnic and religious identity, which supports in fact the existing animosities.

The challenge is to try to determine whether and what constitutes the collective Iraqi identity, differentiate it from other regional identities (e.g. Pan-Arabism) and pan regional (such as Pan-Islamism), what is its effect on the stability of the political system and the processes of democratization. The term Iraqism can be associated with Samir Al-Khalil's usage of it to describe the patriotic dimension of Saddam's charisma, "Saddam has repeatedly stressed that he is a great leader of the greatest nation among Arab nations. That somehow resonates with his people, who sometimes had no bread, but never lacked the circuses"²². Iraqism is, however, primarily a kind of Iraqi nationalism, reaching to the Abbasid era, when the Iraqi province was the unquestioned hegemonic power in the Arab-Muslim caliphate; or even to the ancient empires of Assyria and Babylonia²³. Even among Arab scientists themselves, including Iraqis, there is no consensus as to the existence and constitutive elements of the Iraqi identity. The role of Saddam is particularly in question. For some, the Al Ba'ath ideology embodied in Saddam Husain consolidated the national identity, and for others, it is its great destroyer. The fundamental question is whether contemporary ethnic divisions are a cause or consequence of modern political animosity²⁴.

Fanar Haddad, a prominent researcher into sectarianism in the Middle East, has distinguished three states of ethnic and religious identity: aggressive, passive, and banal²⁵. At a time of insecurity, competing identity claims are likely to move any group's collective sense of itself from banal or passive to a violently assertive one, as the group struggles for survival. However, for these communalistic identities to triumph as an organizing force, the existence of a certain type of sub-national political elite is required. These "ethnic and religious entrepreneurs" have to supply a degree of stability, ideational certainty, and political mobilization. "They can then legitimize their role in terms of identity that aids them in the struggle for popular support and political power. In circumstances of profound uncertainty, people will turn to whatever grouping, militia, or identity offers them the best chance of survival"²⁶. This is particularly evident in Iraq, where primordial tribal ties, ethnic or religious divisions overlap, which in many cases makes it difficult to clearly determine the dominant identity and, depending on the situation, a person may shift by selecting the one that in the current balance of power will guarantee the best economic or social position²⁷. Local, sub-state, and ethnic identities will emerge from this process to provide channels for mobilization and immediate basis for political organization.

A "political entrepreneur", according to the Fanar's definition is the former prime minister Nouri al Maliki. In the public discourse in Iraq, every ethnic, religious or cultural identity has been politicized, which increases, in social perception, the importance and scale of the currently existing divisions. The terms "ethnic" and "ethnicity" are used, for the most part, to describe the activities of political groups, membership in which is based on real or imagined historical ties, supposedly having a continuous and significant impact on the political and socio-economic

conomic position of their representatives²⁸. Iraqi media and politicians consciously use these terms to describe reality. The former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has repeatedly described violence as caused by ethnic hatred²⁹, although not associated with the responsibility of a particular group. For the recipients of this message the responsibility was obvious, which further strengthened the atmosphere of distrust and tension. Despite the fact that majority of Iraqi political parties are largely multiethnic³⁰, for Iraqis, ethnicity continues to be one of the motives of support for a specific group. Although since the first parliamentary elections and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the main parties, including the Maliki's party, changed their names in order not to be associated with a specific religious denomination, they continue to operate in this way in social imagination. Naturally, sectarianism is not a phenomenon typical of Iraq. Modern sectarian political mobilization could be dated back to the Lebanese civil war in 1975, or earlier to the National Pact of 1943, but undoubtedly demise of the Saddam regime was an accelerator for the existing trend and sectarian political discourse has since then dominated the language of the ruling authoritarian regimes and mass media.

Three levels of shaping the political identity can be traditionally distinguished³¹: the state and/or its elite (the primary forces shaping legislation and implementing policies, whether affirmative or discriminatory in nature); ethnic or religious groups able to dominate the public discourse (in this case the Kurds and the Shiites after the US invasion, and the Sunnis before 2003, however, you can also consider the opposite and point to the minority groups or those discriminated against, as they may have a greater impact on shaping the discourse, acting as a counterweight to the elites of the regime); and finally the influential individuals who represent identity-based groups, in case of Iraq, these are for example the prom-

inent members of the Shia religious scholars hierarchy, the *marjaia*, such as a widely respected Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani or, to a lesser extent, a controversial figure of Muqtada As Sadr³².

Although Ba'athist ideology in Iraq did incorporate both the Sunni and Shia symbolism, it was clearly more inclusive of the Sunni than Shia symbols. It was Sunni Islam that was taught in state schools, and various Shia religious rituals were banned under the Baathist regime, like the celebration of Ashura . Centrally, the constant rivalry had an impact on the post war radicalization and discrimination in the public space, which naturally resulted in revanchism. The favouring of Shia symbolism began after 2003, from now on, elites have been striving to recreate the Iraqi nationalism, placing Shiism at its heart. That one-sided policy could prove to be a political hazard, given the influence of Iran, among other things, this could lead to a dilution in the eyes of some citizens of the distinctive features of the proposed nationalism. An effect of this vivisection of the society can be observed for example in the Diyala province³⁴, the former Al Qaeda stronghold, traditionally of predominantly Sunni population, currently having a mixed population and under control of the Shia militia groups, mainly Badr Brigades. As a result of political and demographic changes, large segments of local Sunni population have adapted Shia traditions, after dozens of years something that acted as a safety precaution has become an actual change in the local identity traits.

Miroslav Hroch, a widely acknowledged Czech researcher of nationalism, defines the essential conditions for the formation of a nation³⁵ and states that if a group does not possess the following three conditions, it will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify as people or to bond as a nation: (1) a memory of the common past; (2) linguistic or cultural ties that enable a higher

degree of social communication within the group than that which takes place beyond it; and (3) a conception of equality between members of the group that is organized as a civil society. Although the two first determinants are applicable to Iraq, one can argue to what extent and at what time intervals.

The last of Hroch's conditions appears to be the most problematic in case of Iraq. The fall of secular regime, devolution of all state institutions, dismantling of the army, economic collapse and humanitarian crisis have naturally resulted in a revival of religious and fundamentalist sentiments in the society. A civil society *in statu nascendi* has lost all modern fundamentals and people instinctively turned to traditional tribal and religious structures, because they were the only forum where they could articulate their needs and aspirations. The fundamental challenge facing the Iraqi society is redefinition, or rather self-realization, of the shared identity.

The perspective of Hroch as a researcher of Central and Eastern Europe may not only be helpful in terms of systematising regularities concerning the emergence of nations, but also in terms of enriching our understanding of the realities of the Middle East when compared to the approaches of Arab theoreticians, for the purpose of this paper, on the basis of F. Haddad's methodology.

A range of interconnected indicators for assessing identity and national integration can be used³⁶, the first and most important indicator is *recognition* in two-dimensional approach. It measures not only the degree to which an ethnic or sectarian group accepts another group, but also the extent to which the state recognizes other identity-based groups. The second indicator, *exclusivity*, refers to the degree to which either the state or an identity-based group excludes other groups from its discourses, policies, and practices. The historic Mesopotamia is the home of numerous ethnic and religious

groups, including: Bahias, Jews, Yezidi, Kurds, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Assyrians and of course the Arabs. For decades, during the conflicts and changes in regimes that ruled Iraq, various groups enjoyed a changeable status. The demise of Saddam Hussein's regime led to the revival of dormant ethnic animosities in a fairly similar manner as in the case of Yugoslavia after Tito's death, sometimes it is referred to as "balkanization of Iraq". The cultural, ethnic and religious differences were used to justify violence and discriminatory policies of the state towards particular groups. Affiliations based on confessional and ethnic divisions have replaced the idea of national identity in Iraq, for years holding back the process of national reconciliation.

The third indicator, *primordiality*, concerns the ways in which individuals and groups are deprived of rights due to their primordial identity, such as race, place of birth, or ethnicity. Although the Iraqi constitution emphasizes the multi-ethnicity and freedom of religion, the legislation still needs to be consistent with the Sharia, which is particularly evident in family law, guardianship and inheritance. Law prohibits discrimination based on language, age, disability or gender, but lacks specific provisions dedicated to the protection of ethnic groups³⁷. The least numerous groups such as Assyrians, Yezidis, Mandaeans are still vulnerable to direct attacks³⁸. You have to remember that modern animosities may often have the historical background and the original reluctance was motivated politically rather than ethnically³⁹.

Despite ongoing acts of discrimination, both *the facto* and *the jure*, civic engagement of Iraqi people is increasing. Non-governmental organizations are documenting numerous cases of solidarity surpassing ethnic and religious affiliations, extraordinary in life threatening circumstances. Happenings were organized by residents of many Iraqi cities, in the face of ethnic cleansing carried

out by Daesh when people, regardless of their own faith, went to the streets with banners with inscription, e.g. “I am a Christian”, “I am Nasrani”, or Arabic letter “nun-ن” for Nasrani and posed for photos which were then presented on social media⁴⁰. Nasrani translates as the follower of the Nazarene (Jesus) and has been used by various extremists as a derogative term for Christians⁴¹. Supporters of Daesh used to mark Christian homes, shops, etc., with the Nun symbol⁴², which evokes the worst cases of expulsion in history.

The structures and mechanisms of civil society institutions are emerging and they are achieving their first successes, especially in Kurdistan, where a large number of Iraqi NGOs operate and where majority of Iraq IDPs are resettled, at least temporarily. Local organizations are undertaking every effort to break the social taboo, and reintegrate victims of sexual crimes with their families and local communities. The grassroots efforts resulted in the first symptoms of social change: hundreds of women and girls were rescued and reintegrated, while an increasing number of survivors and their family members are speaking openly about their ordeal in defiance of Daesh⁴³. Traditionally, the collective self-preservation instinct results in victim’s exclusion, and thus, the whole victim’s family is ostracized. Therefore, these achievements are extremely valuable and symptomatic of the condition of Iraqi social fabric, in the face of the use of sexual violence as a tool of war, which leads to the disintegration of traditional social structures, and disrupts in the long term the nation-building and reconciliation processes.

The fourth indicator, *status*, may be measured by the availability of facilities provided by the state for identity-based groups to achieve (or restrict) their aims. The fifth set of measures includes favouritism and hostility, which lead to in-group *favouritism* and out-group *hostility*. The sixth indicator is *claims*, which is useful to measure

the group's assertion of its rights on matters of fundamental interest to the group, including territorial, cultural, religious, and linguistic claims. Finally, *aims* are a measure of the goals and purposes of a specific group or state.

The spirit of Mustafa Sati al Husri⁴⁴, according to whom anyone who spoke Arabic was an Arab, whether that person declared identity or not, seems to be still alive in modern Iraq. It can be said that, anticipating the ideas of Ernest Gellner, Husri shared the view that “the state monopoly of education is more valuable than the monopoly of violence”⁴⁵. Since as a result of subsequent wars in its modern history, the Iraqi state lost the monopoly of violence, a coherent, inclusive, modern education policy should be prioritized in a multi-ethnic and multi religious society, especially in the current perspective of far-reaching federalization. The Minister of Education in the government of Al Maliki, Ali Al Adeeb, when asked (in a television interview in 2013) about the need for a more inclusive educational policy, replied that he sees no need to more broadly integrate into the curriculum the pre-Islamic history of the region or the minority-related topics⁴⁶.

Has the cultural syntagma of collective identities evolved in national Iraqi identity, or is there any potential for the future? In case of multi religious, multiethnic and multilinguistic Iraq, can we talk of a nation or rather of an Iraqi society? Since the regional elections of spring 2013, Iraq has been an arena of numerous demonstrations⁴⁷, sometimes violently dispersed while contesting government efficiency⁴⁸. The introduced reforms were minor. In the summer of 2015, protests erupted in all major cities of Iraq on unprecedented scale, several hundred thousand people were gathered under the slogan “electricity and security”⁴⁹, many foreign media outlets ironically commented as if Iraqis were unable to prioritize in the face of the threat of statehood. These comments

demonstrated not only ignorance of reality, (people were dying in their own homes, in record-breaking heat waves, unable to use any form of air-conditioning), but also ignorance of security issues – efficient management of electricity network is often necessary to carry out successful operations. When asked demonstrators underlined symbolism of the situation, in which government was incapable of counteracting any of those immanent threats. In March and April 2016⁵⁰, another wave of protests erupted, this time anti-corruption protests. People formulated demands demonstrating their political awareness, among others the creation of a bipartisan government of technocrats⁵¹. Among Iraqis there is an increasing awareness of the geopolitical importance of their country, social discontent is becoming proactive, people are becoming more politically engaged, they oppose foreign interference in state matters and start to analyse the nature of influence of the neighbouring countries, namely Iran and Turkey on Iraq⁵². Especially during the crucial phases of the fight with Daesh or ISIL, the Iraqis are aware that territorial integrity and identity are at stake⁵³. Surprisingly, these may be the values able to mobilize even such an inhomogeneous society⁵⁴. All of this may indicate that wide segments of Iraqi society are overcoming their auto-limitations of specific mental tribalism.

The importance of cultural heritage for a sense of identity and national unity is not to be underestimated in the face of overwhelming homogenization of global culture. There is an urgent need for a kind of cultural emancipation. The search for individual and collective identity should be an act of liberation. This process should be conducted voluntarily showing respect for the pluralism of cultures and ethnic groups of the region. Culture is an expression of national identity. Deficiency of responsibility is maintaining a culture of fear and anger. The lack of coherence between the social, political and economic sys-

tems, as well as the insufficient communication between the ruled and the rulers were what had infringed the core of authoritarian regimes during the Arab Spring. That multilevel and multidimensional social deprivation has strengthened the attachment of local societies to religion and tradition, often in their extreme forms.

Fanon wrote about the phenomenon of “colonized intelligence”⁵⁵. Fanon, perhaps to a greater extent than Ben-nabi, was aware that he himself is a “product” of the colonial system. By his personal drama, unlike the others, he was, however, “sentenced to conciseness”⁵⁶. For Fanon the armed struggle during the Algerian war was the only way to awaken national consciousness, liberation, especially at the spiritual level, and it had its price of blood. “The aim of the colonized man, involved in a fight, is the removal of foreign domination, liberation (...) . Independence is not a word [which can be used as an] exorcism, but the condition without which there can be no people really free, holders of all natural resources which allow for the reconstruction of society”⁵⁷.

Arab and Muslim societies require “cultural Arab Spring”. This kind of awakening of nature is possible to appear only in a society that is responsible, free from illusions, self-critical, introspective, but not deprived of optimism or imagination. This often means going through the painful process of national reconciliation, which leads to the liberation from the intellectual and cultural colonialism, frequently not without leaving the stigma. “Rebirth of Arab existence is possible only if one breathes new life into the forgotten patterns, symbols and cultural landscapes. However, the Arab world is now undergoing another crisis that limits awareness and imagination, endangers the Arab identity”⁵⁸. The Arab revolution has to make acts much more serious than overthrow of dictators. According to Franz Fanon, any postcolonial revolution, including struggle for identity, is carried out

by means of an armed struggle, but at the same time “any act of aggression is an act of suicide”, for the Iraqi people as well¹⁹.

NOTES

1. V. Nasr, *The Shia Revival*, Norton, New York 2007, p.20.
2. Ibidem.
3. Among the causes of instability of shatter belt are: a) the non-existence of natural barriers, b) ideological contradictions and differences in the level of development of the neighbouring countries, c) incompatibility of political and ethnic borders.
4. Read more about Abd al Aziz ad Duri in Marek Dziekan, *Złote Stolicy Arabów. Szkice o współczesnej myśli arabskiej*, [Golden Capitals of the Arabs. Essays on Contemporary Arab Thought], Czytelnik, Warszawa 2011, pp. 105–120.
5. M. Dziekan, *Złote Stolicy Arabów. Szkice o współczesnej myśli arabskiej*, Czytelnik, Warszawa 2011, p. 115.
6. Ibidem, pp. 114–117.
7. Ibidem, p. 117.
8. Ibidem, pp. 117–118.
9. Ibidem, p. 116
10. Ibidem, pp. 189–211.
11. Ibidem, pp. 189–200.
12. Ibidem, p. 209.
13. Ibidem, p. 199.
14. According to Bennabi: “A new type of man was no longer under control of spirit (*run*), or reason (*akl*), but only guided by instinct (*ghariza*). At the first and second stages of development, man listens only to the dictates of the spirit and reason – they are somewhat hidden and therefore undetectable. At the third stage, the spirit becomes impotent, while the natural impulses are fully released and become the ruling force of the society. This is the last cycle of civilization”. Ibidem, pp. 200–201.
15. Ibidem, p. 203.
16. Ibidem.
17. Ibidem, p. 204.
18. Ibidem, p. 208.
19. Ibidem, pp. 208–209.

20. Ibidem, p. 205.
21. Ibidem, p. 211.
22. M. Dziekan, *Irak. Religia i polityka*, Warszawa 2005, p. 140.
23. S. al-Khalil, *Republic of fear. The politics of modern Iraq*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1989, p. 122.
24. See more in Sherko Kirmanj, *Identity and Nation in Iraq* <https://www.rienner.com/uploads/511e6527daedf.pdf>, (accessed 14 January 2017)
25. Fanar Haddad, *Sectarianism in Iraq, Antagonistic Visions of Unity* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), p. 25.
26. Andrea Kathryn Talentino, "The Two Faces of Nation-Building: Developing Function and Identity," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol.17, no.3, October 2004, p. 569.
27. Institute for Law and Human Rights, Iihr.org. (all Internet sources accessed on: 20 August 2016, unless stated otherwise), http://www.iilhr.org/documents/MinorityHB_EN.pdf.
28. Ibidem.
29. Josph Rothschild, in: http://www.iilhr.org/documents/MinorityHB_EN.pdf.
30. For example Ayad Allawi a Shia'a, chairman of Al- Irakija, enjoying the Sunni support, which does not prevent him from referring to the terminology of modern secularists.
31. Sherko Kirmanj, *Identity and Nation in Iraq*, p. 17.
32. See more on significance of the marjaia, also referred to as the hawza, and of particular prominent Shia scholars in: Dziekan, Marek *Irak. Religia i polityka*, Warszawa 2005. pp. 43–134 and in International Crisis Group, "Iraq's Shiites Under Occupation", *Middle East Briefing*, Baghdad/Brussels, September 9, 2003,
33. Fanar Haddad, *Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity*, London: Hurst & Co., 2011, p. 33.
34. See more about situation in the Dyjala province in reports of UNAMI, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?searchword=Diyala20population&categories=190,110,156,159,115,158,154,161,164,172,162,163,173,155,170&option=com_k2&view=itemlist&task=search&lang=en&limitstart=80.
35. Miroslav Hroch, *From National Movement*, pp. 78–97.
36. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p. 1; Guibernau, *Anthony D. Smith on Nations*, pp. 131–135.
37. Institute of Law and Human Rights published a report on

- Iraqi minorities, it emphasizes that the representatives of different ethnic groups as well as women and sexual minorities are vulnerable to discrimination, both de facto and de jure. <http://www.iilhr.org/iraq.html>
38. In 2007, in attacks on the Yezidi community in the north of the country more than 400 people were killed. Ethnic animosities were used politically long before the occurrence of so called Islamic State. A striking example of this is the situation of the Iraqi Assyrian population. In 1933, in northern Iraq, there was a massacre of the Assyrians, in which Kurdish troops were actively involved. The slaughter was carried out by the Iraqi army without a decision of the government. The action was justified in the press releases by suspected English-French-Assyrian conspiracy against the Iraqi authorities. See: [en.gantara.de/Woe-to-Those-Who-Don't_Believe-inHell-fire/7966c80351p480/](http://en.gantara.de/Woe-to-Those-Who-Don't-Believe-inHell-fire/7966c80351p480/), M Dziekan, *Historia Iraku* [History of Iraq] pp. 157–158.
39. M. Dziekan, *Historia Iraku*, Warszawa pp. 157–158.
40. <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2014/07/21/Muslims-carrying-I-am-Iraqi-I-am-Christian-slogans-gives-us-hope-says-Iraqi-priest.html>.
41. <http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/09/24/this-is-not-a-one-eyed-smiley-face-its-a-symbol-of-frightening-things-happening-to-middle-east-christians/>.
42. Ibidem.
43. <http://ekurd.net/ngo-helps-yazidi-women-2015-11-06>, <http://www.ncciraq.org/en/ngos/ngo-activities>, <http://thekurdish-project.org/kurdish-nonprofits/>
44. Mustafa Sati al-Husri (1880–1967) was the main ideologue of the courts in Egypt and Iraq, where he revolutionized the school curricula. Al-Husri travelled to Europe and almost throughout the Arab world, during voyages he explored the concept of nation-state and significance of education in nation building process. See more on Husri's Ideas in: *Sati al Husri, Lectures on the emergence of the national idea*, Markaz Disarat al Fuhda al Arabija 1985, Beirut, p. 71 and Adeed Dawish, "Sati al Husri's Theory of Arab Nacionalism", [in], *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair*, Princeton University Press, 2016, pp. 49–74.
45. A. Heywood, *Politologia*, Warszawa 2008, pp. 132–154
46. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/school-curricula-debate-sectarianism-nationalism-iraq.html>

47. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/arab-spring-style-protests-take-hold-in-iraq/2013/02/08/f875ef7e-715f-11e2-b3f3-b263d708ca37_story.html?utm_term=.12ebf8f9b432, access: 30.01, 2017.
48. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-violence-idUSBRE9BT0C620131230>,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/world/middleeast/clashes-at-sunni-protest-site-in-iraq.html>, accessed on 30 January 2017.
49. www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/world/middleeast/protests-and-some-surrenders-as-sun-does-battle-with-iraq.html
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/world/middleeast/iraqs-premier-facing-protests-proposes-government-overhaul.html?_r=0
50. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/tens-thousands-iraqi-protest-central-baghdad-160426104004117.html>
51. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/iraq-parliament-approves-partial-cabinet-reshuffle-160426180253604.html>
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/world/middleeast/iraqs-premier-facing-protests-proposes-government-overhaul.html?_r=0
52. Thousands protest in front of the Turkish embassy in Baghdad: <http://www.reuters.com/video/2016/10/18/iraqis-protest-turkish-military-presence?videoId=370189150>.
53. *Iraqi Leader Resists Us Push For Turkish Role In Mosul Fight*, <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2016/U-S-Defense-Secretary-Ash-Carter-s-push-for-Iraq-to-let-Turkey-play-a-role-in-the-battle-to-retake-Mosul-from-the-Islamic-State-group-has-run-into-resistance-from-Iraq-s-prime-s-minister/id-03d2a6b22ee14df198a269c1d4534cd4>.
54. www.juancole.com/2013/05/demonstrate-sectarianism-national.html.
55. See more in Franz Fanion, *Wyklęty lud ziemi*, Warszawa, preface.
56. Ibidem
57. See more in Franz Fanion, *Wyklęty lud ziemi*, Warszawa, 1985.
58. T. Ramadan, *A curious historical shift, The need for an Arab Cultural Revolution*, 2013
<http://www.tariqramadan.com/spip.php?article12797&lang=fr>
See more in Tarik Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, Oxford University Press, London 2004.
59. Franz Fanion, *Wyklęty lud ziemi*, Warszawa, 1985, p. 180.