«PLAGUE-BEARERS» – FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN THE RANKS OF ISIS AS A THREAT FOR THEIRS HOME COUNTRIES. SELECTED CASES OF ASIAN STATES[1]

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Overview

The sudden rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)[2] in the spring 2014 created a new entity, which at the same time has features of a terrorist group, organized armed formation as well as a quasi-state. On the one hand, this formation possesses some new, unique characteristics, on the other hand, it repeats and replicates the features of similar entities which rose and developed during the armed conflicts of the late XX century, particularly the Mujahedin movements of the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1988). ISIS differs from the previous movements of a similar type mainly by a global scale of its goals, ambitions and actions. Unlike other radical Islamic and jihadist movements in the past, it does not limit its activities to a single state or region, but actively promotes its agenda, recruits members and develops its cells around the world[3]. At the same time ISIS exercises effective control over the vast territories of northern and north-western Iraq as well as eastern and north-eastern Syria. This made it a magnet and a safe heaven for numerous terrorists, fanatics and religious extremists from around the world willing to join the fight and fulfill their obligation of jihad.

The participation of foreign fighters in the armed conflicts is a well known and frequently observed phenomenon, but its scale in the case of ISIS is much larger than in any other similar cases. The Soviet-Afghan War and its aftermath, believed to have the largest share of foreign fighters so far, drew from 20,000 to 35,000 foreigners between 1980 and 1992[4]. The estimated number of foreign fighters who joined the ranks of ISIS between mid-2014 and October 2015 alone is believed to range between 25,000 and 30,000, according to various sources[5].

For Western states, the mass flow of their citizens to Iraq and Syria to join the ranks of ISIS was a nasty surprise and confronted the authorities with a new kind of threat. Asian states however, have had similar experiences. Most of the foreign fighters who joined the mujahedin movements in Afghanistan were citizens of the Middle Eastern, South Asian and South-East Asian countries. Authorities of i.a. Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and most of the states of the Middle East had to contend the threat of radicalized Muslims returning their home countries[6]. This gives them some experience in dealing with this kind of threat.

Foreign fighters in the ranks of ISIS – Middle East

Numbers of foreign fighters from the Middle Eastern states in the ranks of ISIS varies from source to source. The analysis of those sources allows for making reliable but not quite accurate estimates[7]. By far the largest number of Middle Eastern foreign fighters joined ISIS from Tunisia (6,000–7,000), followed by Saudi Arabia (2,500), Turkey and Jordan (around 2,000 from each country), Morocco (1,500), Egypt (600–1,000), Lebanon (900), Libya (600), Algeria (200–250), Yemen (100), Sudan (70-100), Kuwait (70), Israel (40–50), the UAE (15), Qatar (10), Bahrain (10)[8]. This gives a total of over 13,000 foreign fighters from the

Middle East who travelled to Iraq and Syria to join the ji-
had and wage war. In the ranks of Da'ish, they usually play
a role of regular combatants, but they also often carry out
suicide missions. Besides, they provide technical, logistics,
medical or IT support, however to a less extend than better
educated foreign fighters from Europe.

Numbers of people who joined ISIS from individual
Middle Eastern states vary and are sometimes surprising.
A particularly large number of Tunisians is an interesting
phenomenon, and can be explained by a few factors. First
of all, the tradition of Tunisian individuals joining the
cause of jihad traces back to the Soviet-Afghan War. It is
also then that the places serving as recruitment hubs were
established and have been used as such to this day. The
most notorious of such places are Ben Gardane, Tunis and
Bizerte. In Libya, the recruitment hubs in Benghazi and
Derna play a similar role[9]. When combined with poverty,
high unemployment and rising popularity of the ideology
of Islamic fundamentalism that characterize those states,
it makes a perfect environment for the efforts of ISIS re-
cruiters.

The other reason for a large number of foreign fighters
from not very populous states (Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco) is
the inability of the state's authorities to contain them. Not
very proficient security services of those states are busy
enough combating the terrorist threat inside their coun-
tries and do not have resources or capabilities to monitor
the border crossing activities of those suspects who want
to leave the country. Additionally, for some decision mak-
ers this might also seem a tempting alternative, to simply
allow the most dangerous jihadists to leave the country
and wreck havoc elsewhere. This is of course a short-sight-
ed policy, but more often than not an imminent threat is
more pressing and important than the long-term effects,
even if the latter ones will prove to be much more devastat-
ing in the future. The same tactics of "exporting" religious

radicals and extremists for many years had formed also part of the politics of security of Saudi Arabia and was changed as late as in the spring 2014[10].

Security services of some other states, like Algeria, are more foreseeing and aware of the danger posed by returning fighters; thus, they are more successfully trying to prevent them from making journeys to the war zones. A relatively smaller number of foreign fighters from Egypt, Libya or Yemen is of course a result of domestic conflicts in those states. Most of the willing Islamists join local branches of ISIS or other extremist and militant groups; thus, they do not need to or cannot travel abroad to join jihad in Iraq or Syria. Another quite obvious factor influencing the number of foreign fighters is the distance and proximity to the Iraqi and Syrian borders. This results in a high number of Jordanians, Turks and Lebanese in the ranks of ISIS[11].

Foreign fighters in the ranks of ISIS – Southeast Asia

As the numbers and the scale of involvement in ISIS of foreign fighters joining the Islamic State are based on rough estimations and far from being precise, so the scale of support from the Southeast Asian states in particular varies significantly from source to source. The fluctuation of people joining ISIS and/or other groups fighting in Syria and Iraq also poses a challenge for correct data. Additionally, in some countries the scale of support for ISIS is downplayed by local authorities for reasons of internal politics, but also some sources are taking into consideration only the fighters themselves while others include members of their families as well[12].

However, taking into consideration that most of the recruits came from states with majority of Muslim population (Indonesia, Malaysia) or from those with significant Muslim population (southern Thailand and southern Philippines), the total number of Southeast Asian fighters is

not as large as the number of those from Europe or Middle East. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe the trend of a growing number of Indonesians, Malaysians and other nationals joining the ranks of ISIS.

According to an Indonesian intelligence official, in the mid-2014 an estimated 300 Indonesians joined the Islamic State militant group fighting in Syria and Iraq[13]. However, another source informs of only approximately more than 50 Indonesian nationals and at least as many Malaysians fighting in Syria in June 2014[14]. But until March 2015, an estimated 500 fighters from the SEA region, including southern Thailand, had joined ISIS[15]. Thus, despite the lack of credible data, the growing number of fighters from the SEA is noticeable, as information is also available of 350 Indonesians joining ISIS in January 2015, and more than 700 fighters from Indonesia and over 200 fighters from Malaysia fighting in Iraq and Syria in May 2015[16]. In addition, there is information of 200 Filipinos[17]. Some possible explanations of the discrepancy between data is the fact that some of the fighters joining ISIS had already been in the Middle East as students of Islamic schools and workers when the Islamic State was proclaimed, and others are traveling as would-be students[18]. Nevertheless, the numbers are still controversial, as there is evidence of families joining the ISIS, e.g. in March 2015, ISIS posted photos and a video of a group of at least 20 Malay-speaking children training with weapons[19].

Even if there are no exact data, the number of Southeast Asian fighters need to be significant enough to create from Indonesian and Malaysian militants fighting in Syria in August 2014 a military unit for Malay-speaking ISIS fighters called Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyyah (Malay archipelago unit for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria)[20]. At the beginning, Katibah Nusantara had at least 22 members (in September 2014)[21] and reached at least about 100 men. There are several factors influencing the

creation of a separate unit for Southeast Asians. The basic argument for the creation of a special unit are potential communication problems, as not all fighters speak Arabic or English well enough. Furthermore, creation of the Katibah Nusantara unit could be an important vehicle to increase the level of recruitment (mostly via social media), making the joining of ISIS more attractive for potential fighters from Southeast Asia. In addition, this could form the basis for the expansion of "jihadist movement" and the terrorist network in Southeast Asia. As one of the analysts said: "This group was formed with a goal to recruit and facilitate people who want to go to Syria to defend the Islamic caliphate, and also do counter-attacks against governments that repress caliphate supporters"[22].

Based on the accessible data,the number of Southeast Asians joining ISIS could be estimated at approximately 1,000 people. It is far below the number of fighters from Europe, for example. This situation could be explained by the geographical distance between Southeast Asia and Middle East, which contributes to high travel costs. This issue plays an important role as domestic militant groups in Indonesia, for example, are raising funds to send each recruit to Syria[23]. Another factor is related to internal developments in the Southeast Asian states. For those who want to take militant actions there are other possibilities than joining the ISIS, especially in Indonesia or the Philippines, so there is no need for travelling to Syria or Iraq. Additionally, the fighting experience of extremists returning home after the Afghan War and close links with Al-Qaeda of domestic terrorist groups make the local governments more aware of the possible consequences of a resurgence of terrorist networks. Thus, they are adopting various instruments to cope with the growing threat (especially in Singapore and Malaysia).

The biggest concern for Middle Eastern states is the risk that the plague of extremist Islamic ideologies will spread to their territories and radicalize their own citizens. Such a threat can be a result of the return of veteran foreign fighters to their home countries as well as of self-radicalization of some local extremists, who had never joined the fight in Iraq or Syria, but are influenced by ISIS ideology via the Internet, television or other media. That is for example the case of Egyptian group Ansar Bayt al Maqdis, which announced its alignment with ISIS and changed its name to Sinai Province (Sinai Wilayat) in November 2014[24]. The group operates in the Sinai Peninsula and carries out attacks, especially on Egyptian army and security forces, but is believed to be responsible for some famous terrorist attacks on tourists, including the shooting down of Russia's Metrojet A321 airliner on October 31, 2015.

In Libya three different groups declared themselves to be ISIS *wilayat* (provinces) in Fezzan, Tripoli and Barqah. The last one includes the aforementioned town of Derna, known as an important recruitment hub for many jihadist groups. In Algeria, a splinter group from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb known as Jund-al-Khalifa pledged its allegiance to ISIS in September 2014[25]. Weaker and less established are the affiliates of ISIS in the Arab Peninsula (Saudi Arabia and Yemen), Afghanistan and Pakistan. Those territories are traditional and steadfast strongholds of Al-Qaeda and ISIS expansion there was met with firm response from the old guard jihadists, who try to protect their influences. Nonetheless, ISIS has marked its presence in those areas and has been acting to simultaneously weaken the local authorities, deepen the religious strife and fight its competitors (Al-Qaeda loyalists and other independent jihadist groups)[26]. There is also no doubt that ISIS has numerous tacit supporters in all the Arab Peninsula states

as well in Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. Their activity so far is limited to financial assistance and support expressed on the web, but potentially they may form a nucleus of the ISIS affiliate groups in those states[27].

ISIS supporters in Asian States – Southeast Asia

A major concern for governments of the Southeast Asian states is a potential threat posed by returning fighters for regional security (the militants who returned home would constitute a potential threat as they would bring with them the combat training, weapons skills and international contacts), but also the action undertaken by self-radicalized individuals who may be influenced by ISIS to carry out attacks in their home countries.

In Southeast Asia, support for ISIS was growing significantly in 2014 following the victories of ISIS and further strengthened by other factors attracting militants to Syria, i.a. prophetic tradition, the need to help Sunni Muslims in Syria, fighting Shi'ism, and re-establishment of a caliphate[28]. Some are drawn by ISIS extreme ideology, while others are lured by the promise of financial gain. Some recruits say they receive a salary and their accommodation is covered by ISIS[29].

Nevertheless, not all individuals and groups supporting ISIS are joining the fights in Syria, and some local militant organizations are pledging allegiance to ISIS, similarly as two groups from the Philippines, namely the Mindanao-based Abu Sayyaf group and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters[30]. The forms of support vary because some are fighting in Syria, others in their home countries, while some Indonesian jihadi circles, for example, are raising money and pledging allegiance to the ISIS[31].

However, the scale of support for ISIS in Southeast Asia needs to be confronted with wider support for militant actions, not necessarily linked with Da'ish. For example, in

Indonesia the jihadi groups are roughly divided into those that supported violence in Indonesia and those that believed that violence at home was counter-productive[32]. In the latter case, the support splits between ISIS and al-Nusra Front. The best known Southeast Asian terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah, generally supportsal-Nusra Front, in line with its tradition of close relationships with Al-Qaeda. The other group, Jama'ah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), however, demonstrates partial support for al-Nusra Front and partial support for the Islamic State[33], while the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT), based in Poso, Central Sulawesi, demonstrates support for ISIS[34].

Actions undertaken by the governments
– Middle East and Southeast Asia

The governments of the Middle Eastern states undertook various actions to counter the threat posed by ISIS, however, their scale and intensity varies from country to country. The main determinants include the actual scale of the threat, the authorities' awareness of danger, capabilities and resources held, external conditions (e.g. foreign assistance), and last but not least, political will to fight ISIS. An example of the lack of political will to face the threat of ISIS is the attitude of Saudi Arabia. Since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Saudis had consequently and efficiently supported the armed opposition against the regime of Basher al-Assad. It was their effort, supported by Qatar and Turkey, which transformed the secular uprising against an authoritarian regime into a Sunni revolt against all non-Sunnis in Syria. This policy changed in February and March 2014 when Saudi authorities, apparently frightened by the power of the monster they had helped to create, undertook some actions to cut off the financing and support for the jihadists in Syria and Iraq[35].

The Hashemite monarchy of Jordan, on the other hand, had struggled against the Islamic extremist forces at home and abroad since quite a long time, being aware of the threat they pose for the security and stability of the kingdom. In this case as well, the efforts were increased as a result of political events, when a Jordanian pilot Lt. Muath al-Kaseasbehm was burned to death by his Da'ish captors in December 2014[36].

The measures most commonly used to counter the threat posed by returning foreign fighters and ISIS sympathizers include inter alia the close surveillance of suspects and the development of secret services. The countries whose citizens are leaving to fight alongside Da'ish also tighten their border controls to prevent them from travelling abroad and in some cases to prevent them from returning home[37]. Amending the law, especially the antiterrorist regulations, is the other common method. It is usually aimed at giving the security apparatus and justice more freedom, powers and capabilities in dealing with the real or potential threats from the Islamic extremists[38]. Finally, some of the states undertake direct military actions and join the attacks on ISIS-controlled territories. At the moment almost every Middle Eastern country is involved in at least one of several anti-ISIS coalitions. Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE are part of the US-led coalition intervening in Syria and Iraq (CJTF-OIR). The Egyptian army intervenes in Libya to back the moderate Libyan government against ISIS supporters and other Islamic radicals there, while Iran is backing the military efforts of Basher al-Assad regime in Syria and Iraqi governments struggle with ISIS. Other Middle Eastern states are part of the Islamic Military Alliance, an intergovernmental organization aimed at fighting ISIS and the threat of terrorism in general, however many of them do not participate in any direct military actions[39].

Governments of Southeast Asian states had undertaken various actions against domestic terrorist groups even be-

fore the rise of ISIS. In most cases, the motivation came from the events followed by the creation of Jemaah Islamiyah, a regional terrorist organization established by an Indonesian Abu Bakar Ba'asyir[40], but also from the existence of various Muslim separatist movements, especially in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. As a result of actions undertaken by the governments on the level of legislation (e.g. the adoption of special antiterrorist law[41]), surveillance, strengthening the police forces and antiterrorist campaigns involving the police and military in most Southeast Asian countries, the radical Muslim groups were put under state control and their influence was limited. But the rise of ISIS reinvigorated the threat posed by the jihadist groups.

For example in Indonesia, the danger from terrorist groups was largely limited due to successful actions of an antiterrorist police unit – Densus 88. Additionally, in July 2010, the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) was created to strengthen the state's capability against terrorist groups. However, at the beginning the government was reluctant about actions that needed to be adopted in the wake of the ISIS establishment. In August 2014, ISIS was declared a banned organization[42] and Indonesia's president Joko Widodo agreed to issue a regulation allowing the authorities to revoke the passports of citizens who support ISIS. Moreover, BNPT declared that Indonesians who supported and joined ISIS could lose their citizenship[43]. But this actions were not very effective and the need to improve deradicalization measures and tighten security in prisons was even greater[44].

The nature of the threat – Middle East and Southeast Asia

The threat for the internal security posed by returning foreign fighters is difficult to estimate accurately. Data from previous years reveal that between 1990 and 2010,

"...approximately 11 percent of foreign fighters have become active security threats after returning home..."[45]. It is unknown of course how many of the Middle Eastern foreign fighters will survive at all and have a chance to return home, and if they do, how many of them will want to return. Chaos and open war raging in Iraq and Syria creates better conditions for the jihadists to realize their religious, ideological, political or personal goals than relatively stable and fairly well protected countries of their origin. If they return, the authorities must be, however, aware of a number of threats they will definitely pose for the state security as well as stability of the regimes.

First of all the returning jihadists are usually much better fighters than they were at the time of leaving their homes. Involvement in combat alone gives them the military experience and skills they lacked before. Additionally, in the ranks of ISIS many of them undergo a more specialized combat training, instructed usually by former Iraqi and Syrian army officers, which makes them capable military veterans. Other assets, which the returning foreign fighters bring back home, are the contacts and links with the ISIS headquarters, which provide them with equipment, financial resources and organizational support required to carry out terrorist activities. It is worth noting that in order to mislead security services or just wait for a good opportunity to strike, returning jihadists do not have to start to operate immediately, but may instead become sleeping agents, ready to act if necessary. Finally, foreign fighters in the ranks of ISIS are usually religiously indoctrinated and subject to ideological manipulation. Thus, upon returning to their home countries they are usually more radical and extremist Islamic fundamentalist than they were before. Even if they do not get directly involved in any military operations or violent actions, they pose a threat as preachers spreading the ideology of jihad and calling to arms other individuals.

The most serious challenge posed by those in Southeast Asia who support ISIS is for overall regional security and for specific states stability, and more specifically, the possibility to reinvigorate the terrorist activity in the region[46]. As general Moeldoko, the former commander of the Indonesian military (TNI) pointed out, ISIS is a significant threat to regional security. However, its full impact would be felt when its fighters from Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia and from Singapore return home[47]. Thus, the general impact of former ISIS-fighters would be similar to the situation in the Middle Eastern states.

The returning fighters could be a threat similar to that posed by Jemaah Islamiyah members from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, who returned after training in Afghanistan. However, ISIS fighters have direct battle experience and strong cross-regional bonds established during the fights in Syria (e.g. as the members of Katibah), and could form the core of new terrorist networks[48]. ISIS could serve as a vehicle for training people capable of carrying out attacks in Iraq and Syria, to instigate Southeast Asians to mount attacks in their home countries and to radicalize Southeast Asians via social media, recruit them and physically facilitate their entry into Iraq and Syria. Even if some will be killed in Syria, those returning to their home countries will pose a more serious risk (e.g. the Indonesian militants who returned home would constitute a potential threat as they would bring with them the combat training, weapons skills and international contacts). Another challenge is posed by those who travel to Syria with their families, which creates the danger of growing the next generation of fighters[49].

Conclusions

Governments of the Asian states, both in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, are aware of the threat posed by foreign

fighters who joined ISIS and return home. They know that the returnees will be more radicalized, fanatical and better motivated to wage jihad in their home countries than they were at the time of leaving for Iraq and Syria. What is more, the authorities understand that returning individuals will be more experienced and better trained warriors, who have developed their combat skills on the battlefield. They already have an experience of the returning veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War at the late 80s and early 90s as well as the struggle with the terrorist groups created by them. Thus, some of them might be better prepared to deal with the new threat, if only because they have already developed procedures and infiltrated the circles of Islamic extremists. On the other hand, there are several significant weaknesses and limitations of the Asian states in dealing with the new threat and the plague of a new wave of jihadists. First and foremost the general level of security standards in most of the Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian states is lower than in the Western countries and requires significant improvements. The security procedures are often faulty and deficient and legal shortcomings make fighting the terrorism an even more difficult task. General weakness of state institutions is another serious problem, as the structures and units responsible for the state security are not free of problems typical for this regions of the world, such as corruption, nepotism, mismanagement, low level of training and poor leadership.

NOTES

1. The article is a result of the research for the project „Dilemmas of military security of the Asian states – internal conditions of securitization". Project has been financed with the grant of National Science Centre, decision number DEC-2013/09/D/HS5/00071.
2. Also referred to as Da'ish (an acronym of its Arabic name *ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-'Irāq wa-sh-Shām*), Islamic State of

Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or Islamic State (IS), as they themselves want to be called.

3. J. Stern, J.M. Berger, *ISIS. The state of terror*, London 2015, pp. 101–125.

4. *Compare: 2015 Global Terrorism Index*, Institute for Economics and Peace, http://economicsandpeace.org/reports/, [21.12.2015]; D. Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, London 2006, p. 174.

5. *Compare: 2015 Global Terrorism Index; Foreign Fighters In Iraq & Syria*, Radio Free Europe, http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html, [21.12.2015]; *Foreign Fighters. An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq*, The Soufan Group, December 2015; Syria conflict: Number of foreign fighters 'doubled in 16 months', BBC News, 8.12.2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35043939, [28.12.2015].

6. J. Jarząbek, "Rozwój radykalnych ugrupowań islamskich w wybranych państwach Azji Południowej i Południowo-Wschodniej", [w:] *Azja Wschodnia i Azja Południowa w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, Warszawa 2011, s. 398–414.

7. The previously mentioned sources will serve as a basis for analysis: *2015 Global Terrorism Index; Foreign Fighters In Iraq & Syria*, Radio Free Europe; *Foreign Fighters. An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq*, The Soufan Group; *Syria conflict: Number of foreign fighters «doubled in 16 months»*, BBC News.

8. The number of Palestinians is particularly difficult to estimate, as they may be included in the numbers of citizens of Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and other states.

9. *Foreign Fighters. An Updated Assessment....*

10. Then king Abdallah issued a decree forbidding his people participation in foreign armed conflicts. King dismissed also some of the officials known for supporting this kind of activity, including the chief of Saudi intelligence, Bandar ibn Sultan. P. Cockburn, *Państwo Islamskie*, Warszawa 2014, pp. 146–147.

11. There are however virtually no Iranians there, as its 95% of Shia majority is considered by ISIS to be apostates, and the potential joiners among the small Sunni minority can by easily controlled and contained by well trained and developed Iranian security services.

12. Zachary Abuza, *Joining the New Caravan: ISIS and the Regeneration of Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 25.06.2015, http://www.

strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/joining-the-new-caravan/2015/06/25 [29.12.2015].

13. Rendi A. Witular, "Abu Bakar Ba'asyir calls on followers to support ISIL", *The Jakarta Post*, 14.07.2014 http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/07/14/abu-bakar-ba-asyir-calls-followers-support-isil.html#sthash.cc9VEznM.dpuf [14.12.2015].

14. Zakir Hussain, Shannon Teoh, "ISIS fighters from M'sia, Indonesia form military unit", *The Straits Times*, 26.09.2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/09/26/isis-fighters-msia-indonesia-form-military-unit.html#sthash.nsiJfcfJ.dpuf [14.12.2015].

15. Zakir Hussain, "ISIS posts footage of boy-trainees from SE Asia", *The Straits Times*, 17.03.2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/03/17/isis-posts-footage-boy-trainees-se-asia.html#sthash.10ROYU8E.dpuf [18.12.2015].

16. Lim Yan Liang, "ISIS backers set sights on Singapore targets", *The Straits Times*, 29.05.2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/05/29/isis-backers-set-sights-singapore-targets.html#sthash.DPTSMR7g.dpuf [18.12.2015].

17. Ahmed S. Hashim, *The Impact of Islamic State in Asia. Policy Report*, Singapore 2015, s. 12.

18. Rendi A. Witular, "Abu Bakar Ba'asyir calls on followers to support ISIL", *The Jakarta Post*, 14.07.2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/07/14/abu-bakar-ba-asyir-calls-followers-support-isil.html#sthash.cc9VEznM.dpuf [14.12.2015].

19. Zakir Hussain, *ISIS posts footage ...*

20. In 2015 it was renamed on Majmu'ah al-Arkhabiliy.

21. Zakir Hussain, Shannon Teoh, *ISIS fighters from M'sia...*

22. Ibidem.

23. Rendi A. Witular, *Abu Bakar Ba'asyir ...*

24. J. Stern, J.M. Berger, op. cit., p. 185.

25. Ibidem.

26. H.Gambhir, *Meet ISIL's most dangerous affiliates*, Institute for the Study of War, December 2015, http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/meet-isil%E2%80%99s-most-dangerous-affiliates, [5.1.2016]. More on ISIS-Al-Qaeda conflict also in J. Stern, J.M. Berger, op. cit., p. 187–191.

27. Particularly dangerous is the situation in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, as they border ISIS controlled territories in Iraq and Syria and had accepted large numbers of refugees. This makes it a lot easier for Da'ish to support establishment of its local cells in those countries.

28. Sidney Jones, "Solahudin, ISIS in Indonesia", *Southeast Asian Affairs* 2015, s. 155-156.

29. Yuliasri Perdani, "With Iraq gains, ISIS finds traction with Indonesian hard-liners", *The Jakarta Post*, 14.06.2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/06/14/with-iraq-gains-isis-finds-traction-with-indonesian-hard-liners.html#sthash.KUH-CDncd.dpuf [28.12.2015].

30. Zakir Hussain, Shannon Teoh, *ISIS fighters from M'sia...*

31. Yuliasri Perdani, *With Iraq gains...*

32. These groups are under influence of thoughts of the Jordanian writer Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.

33. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir has instructed his followers to support ISIS, Rendi A. Witular, *Abu Bakar Ba'asyir ...*

34. Sidney Jones, "Solahudin, ISIS in Indonesia", *Southeast Asian Affairs* 2015, p. 161–162.

35. P. Cockburn, op. cit., p. 145–146.

36. D. Peled, "ISIS in Jordan: King Abdullah's Battle for the Soul of Islam", *Haaretz*, 25.11.2015, http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/isis/jordan/1.688313, [5.1.2016].

37. For example by revoking their citizenship. In August 2014 Oman, Bahrain and the UAE changed their citizenship law in order to allow them to revoke citizenship of any individual who is suspected of terrorism or poses a threat to national security. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait had already introduced such regulations into their law. They are, however, more often used to crack down the local anti-governmental opposition than the terrorists themselves. G. Okruchlik, "Rethinking the politics of distributive states", [in:] *Oil States in the New Middle East*, K. Selvik, B.O. Utvik (eds.), 2016, https://books.google.pl/books?id=RPksCgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=pl#v=onepage&q&f=false, [5.1.2016].

38. Sometimes those changes are the subject of criticism by the organizations involved in the protection of human rights, like it happened in Jordan. The authorities, however, explain the need for their introduction by the security issues. *King Urged to Repeal Draconian Changes to Anti-Terrorism Law*, http://en.rsf.org/jordan-king-urged-to-repeal-draconian-16-06-2014,46423.html, [5.01.2016]; *Jordan: Terrorism Amendments Threaten Rights*, HRW, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/17/jordan-terrorism-amendments-threaten-rights, [5.01.2016].

39. Algeria remains the only notable Middle Eastern state not involved in any anti-ISIS coalition.

40. Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia*, London and New York 2007.

41. However, new legislations were also used against political opponents e.g. in Malaysia.

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